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Political connection and managerial entrenchment: Evidence 
from CEO turnovers in China 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence that political connection can hurt corporate 
governance by aggravating managerial entrenchment. CEO’s political connection 
lowers the probability of forced CEO turnover by about 20% on average in Chinese 
listed firms. This pattern is especially strong in privately controlled firms compared to 
state-owned enterprises. Political connection also significantly lowers the sensitivity 
between CEO turnover and firm performance, thereby weakening disciplinary 
mechanism to replace poorly performing CEOs. Following forced CEO turnover in 
the presence of political connection, firm performance improves. These findings 
provide strong evidence that political connection does indeed lead to undesirable 
managerial entrenchment. 
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1. Introduction 
   A substantial body of literature on political connection has emerged in recent 
years (Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008; 
Chen et al., 2010; Faccio, 2010; Faccio et al., 2010). The extant studies focus 
primarily on the sources of value that political connection provides, such as 
preferential access to credit, regulatory protection, and government financial 
assistance. Whereas these benefits can enhance firm value, research also points to the 
downside of such connections: the substantial resources that politically connected 
firms must dedicate to rent seeking activities (Faccio, 2010). In the case of China, 
although several papers document a positive effect of political connection in privately 
controlled firms (Li et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008), Fan et al., (2007) provide clear 
evidence of its negative effect on firm performance in state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). 
One important disciplinary mechanism for enhancing managerial incentives is 
CEO turnover, a credible threat or action to replace underperforming CEOs, whose 
relationship to firm performance has been studied extensively (Denis et al., 1997; 
Volpin, 2002; Huson et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2008; Conyon and He, 2008; Chang 
and Wong, 2009). These prior studies, often treating CEO turnover as an internal 
monitoring mechanism, document both a negative relationship between CEO turnover 
and firm performance and an improvement in firm performance after CEO 
replacement. Our paper thus attempts to fill a research void by examining the impact 
of political connection on CEO turnover and the turnover-performance relationship.  
 In China, political connection is a common phenomenon because, even though 
the corporatization and privatization of state owned economy since 1978 has resulted 
somewhat in the decentralization of authority, the state shareholder still controls 
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personnel decisions. Most particularly, either the central or local government has 
authority over the selection, appointment, and dismissal of top executives in SOEs. 
Even privately controlled firms, if converted from former SOEs, are likely to build 
political connections or maintain previous connections because they provide 
preferential access to financial resources like loans and help companies to avoid strict 
regulatory oversight (Dinc, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008). At the 
same time, because China is also a transitional economy with weak law enforcement 
and institutional constraints, many Chinese companies are involved with the state, 
operate with low efficiency (Wei et al., 2005), and have poor corporate governance 
(Firth et al., 2006). Thus, whether CEOs are disciplined appropriately and monitored 
effectively remains an open question. The Chinese context therefore provides an 
excellent laboratory in which to examine and explain the effects of political 
connection on the corporate governance system, particularly on CEO turnover and 
turnover-performance sensitivity.  
Based on a comprehensive sample of CEO turnover in China’s listed firms from 
2002 to 2007, we define politically connected firms as those whose CEOs were 
formerly or are currently officers affiliated with the government.1 We find that nearly 
45% of the CEOs in our sample are politically connected, 34.55% in SOEs and 
10.45% in privately controlled firms. First, we not only find a significant negative 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance, we show that this 
relationship is much stronger in privately controlled firms than in SOEs, which 
suggests that such CEO turnover is occurring to replace poorly performing executives. 
Second, we find that CEOs are less likely to be replaced if they are politically 
connected, an effect that is significantly stronger in privately controlled firms. Third, 
 
1 Our definition of political connection is the same as that used in previous studies, including Faccio et 
al. (2006), Fan et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2010).  
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we find that, consistent with Denis et al. (1997), managerial ownership is inversely 
related to CEO turnover. We also provide strong empirical evidence that CEOs with 
political connections are associated with a significantly lower turnover-performance 
relationship than their non-politically connected peers. More important, we find that 
following CEO turnover, firm performance increases more significantly in firms 
without political connections than in those with political connections. However, in 
firms with such connections, CEO replacement can effectively enhance firm 
performance relative to the performance of firms in which no CEO replacement 
occurs. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to document the entrenchment 
effect of CEOs’ political connections, which, our results indicate, can substitute for 
the disciplinary mechanism of CEO turnover by lowering turnover-performance 
sensitivity. In fact, the evidence clearly suggests that politically connected CEOs are 
more entrenched and more likely to retain their positions even when the firm is 
experiencing poor performance. By being among the first to carry out comprehensive 
analysis of the CEO turnover-firm performance association in China, this study makes 
a valuable contribution to the extant literature on corporate governance. Most 
particularly, we offer the first empirical findings on whether political connection 
affects CEO turnover and how it substitutes for internal governance by lowering 
turnover-performance sensitivity.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the extant literature. Section 3 develops detailed hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the data and outlines the research methods. Section 5 reports the empirical 
results. Section 6 presents our examination of post-turnover performance, and section 
7 concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review 
International evidence on executive turnover, a major topic within the corporate 
governance area, amply documents the replacement of top executives as an alternative 
mechanism for disciplining underperforming top executives by showing that CEO 
turnover is often associated with poor firm performance and low managerial 
ownership (Kaplan, 1994a, 1994b; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Franks et al., 2001; 
Conyon and Florou, 2002; Volpin, 2002). Weisbach (1988) finds that poor firm 
performance is related to forced CEO turnover. Denis et al. (1997), furthermore, 
provide evidence that CEO turnover is negatively related to the ownership stake of 
officers and directors. We therefore extend Denis et al. (1997) by explicitly examining 
whether political connection of CEOs affects CEO turnovers in addition to ownership 
of executives. 
   Several studies examine top executive turnover and its relation to firm 
performance in China (Groves et al., 1995; Aivazian et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2007; 
Cheng et al., 2008; Chang and Wong, 2009). Among these, Kato and Long (2006) 
show that CEO turnover is negatively related to a firm’s financial performance, a 
finding that Firth et al. (2006) confirm by focusing on the relationship between 
chairman turnover and firm performance. Likewise, Conyon and He (2008), who 
examine both CEO and chairman turnover using a 1999−2006 sample of 1,200 
Chinese listed firms, find that, consistent with the agency model, the turnover of both 
types of top official is inversely related to a firm’s profitability.  
Studies on the function of political connection provide evidence for two different 
aspects: the benefits of political connection and the costs of related rent seeking 
activities. Studies focused on the benefits show that political connection can help 
7 
 
firms by relaxing tax regulation, enabling preferential corporate bailouts and/or 
financing convenience, and facilitating rent seeking (Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et 
al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010), all of which suggest a positive effect on firm value and 
performance. Other researchers, however, argue that politically connected firms must 
devote substantial resources to their rent seeking activities, which may well eliminate 
any advantage from the political connection (Fan et al., 2007; Faccio, 2010). These 
authors view political connection as government intervention and a desire to satisfy 
the objectives of social services. Both viewpoints are observable in the emerging 
research on China.  Li et al. (2008), for instance, using a sample of China’s privately 
controlled listed firms, provide evidence that politically connected CEOs have a 
positive effect on firm performance. Fan et al. (2007), on the other hand, who use a 
1993−2001 sample of IPO firms to focus primarily on the intervention of political 
connection, argue that politically connected firms underperform those without 
political connection. These previous studies, however, do not examine the effect of 
political connection on CEO turnover. We therefore hope to shed light on this issue 
using a sample of all the nonfinancial firms listed on two Chinese stock exchanges. 
 
3. Institutional background and hypotheses 
Over the last 30 years, China has adopted economic reforms and an SOE 
restructuring process that have resulted in decision-making rights being decentralized 
from the government to the firm level, Nonetheless, although the state has 
relinquished authority in some areas, it retains control of many SOEs, particularly in 
terms of appointments to top managerial positions in state-controlled firms. Thus, 
political intervention has a significant impact on corporate governance systems. 
Moreover, as many authors argue, it is not the state itself that is the real owner of 
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SOEs but rather agents of the government who are acting on the government’s behalf. 
As a result, state shareholders have multiple objectives beyond simply maximizing 
firm value as expected in the traditional agency model. There is therefore a need to 
examine how top management is monitored and whether the current internal 
monitoring mechanism is effective.  
During the early 1990s, some SOEs were allowed to issue shares and trade on the 
two stock exchanges set up in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The motivation behind this 
corporatization and privatization process was the government’s desire to adopt a 
market-oriented economic system. In this sense, CEOs are now acting more like their 
counterparts in western countries and are taking responsibility for maximizing 
shareholder wealth. According to agency theory, there is a high probability that these 
CEOs will be terminated or replaced in the presence of poor firm performance, 
suggesting a negative relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance that 
is indeed supported by many studies on China (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 
2006; Chang and Wong, 2009). We therefore construct the following hypothesis: 
H1: CEO turnover is negatively related to firm performance. 
The emerging research on China also extensively examines the role of political 
connection (Li et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010), pointing to its 
occurrence in both SOEs and privately controlled firms. Chinese SOEs, however, 
have one unique characteristic: a politically controlled personnel system in which 
different levels of government have the ultimate authority over the appointment and 
dismissal of many top executives, which results directly in politically connected 
CEOs. In addition, SOE reform has been characterized by the separation of the 
government function from enterprise management, leading many government officials 
to choose positions in the latter over their original positions in government.  
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On the other hand, since the Chinese market appears underdeveloped and 
inefficient and provides little protection for outside investors, the privately controlled 
firms have incentives to establish political connections to extract rents from the 
government and obtain relief from some of their problems (Faccio, 2010). As a result, 
two waves of political connection establishment took place in privately controlled 
firms, involving mainly politically connected CEOs. The first wave occurred in the 
early 1990s just after Deng Xiaoping’s inspection of south China, when many 
government officials chose to become self-employed and establish their own 
businesses. The second wave transpired during the early 2000s when some 
government officials relinquished their original positions to accept posts in privately 
controlled firms. These privately controlled firms, in turn, were likely to appoint 
politically connected CEOs, especially when they found themselves in financial 
distress (Li et al., 2006). This political connection in privately controlled firms is seen 
as a resource and a protection from government that can improve firm performance 
and overcome state or market failure (Li et al., 2008). Consequently, private investors 
are more likely to retain politically connected CEOs in order to maintain their power 
and performance. Accordingly, because of the benefits derived from such political 
connection, we conjecture that politically connected CEOs are more likely to be 
entrenched and less likely to be dismissed: 
H2: CEO turnover is negatively related to CEO political connection. 
As discussed above, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be terminated, 
suggesting a weaker relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. In 
addition, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee of the 
State Council (SASAC), the agent of the government, has issued interim regulations 
on evaluating the operating performance of top executives in central government 
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affiliated SOEs, which include a “talking system” that precludes the punishment or 
immediate dismissal of poorly performing executives in SASAC-controlled SOEs. In 
such cases, the SASAC sends experts to help these SOEs overcome performance 
failure (SASAC, 2003), a mediation also used in SOEs controlled by the local 
SASAC. Moreover, because these politically connected CEOs are more likely to act 
as government representatives, they care more about the growth of the state-owned 
assets invested in SOEs and such objectives as the labor force supply and the region’s 
budgetary deficit (Chang and Wong, 2009). Nonetheless, politically connected CEOs 
in privately controlled firms also have a close relationship with the government and 
always perform better than their peers without political connections. At the same time, 
private investors are motivated to retain all the benefits arising from their political 
connections and are less likely to dismiss politically connected CEOs even when they 
underperform. Therefore, political connection is likely to lead to a weaker 
turnover-performance relationship: 
H3: The CEO turnover-firm performance relationship is weaker if the CEO is 
politically connected. 
Because state-owned firms operate with multiple objectives (e.g., providing social 
services), they do not focus solely on maximizing firm value (Clarke, 2003). In this 
sense, CEO turnover in state-owned firms may also be determined by certain other 
indicators. Nonetheless, because private investors appoint CEOs as their 
representatives with the aim of maximizing shareholder wealth, private controlling 
shareholders have sufficient incentives to monitor top managers and dismiss them for 
poor performance (Firth et al., 2006). We thus hypothesize the following: 
H4: The CEO turnover-firm performance relationship is weaker in SOEs and 
stronger in privately controlled firms. 
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Our last hypothesis relates to managerial ownership by politically connected 
CEOs, who in many cases are awarded firm equity to better align managerial behavior 
with the interests of shareholders and promote increased firm value (Hu and Zhou, 
2008; Benson and Davidson, 2009). In such cases, if the convenience resulting from 
political connection is to be fully utilized, politically connected CEOs are more likely 
to be entrenched and less likely to be removed because of their close relationship with 
the firm: 
H5: The CEO turnover-firm performance relationship is weaker if the politically 
connected CEOs hold managerial ownership.  
 
4. Sample selection and research methods 
4.1 Sample selection 
We obtain information on CEO-specific characteristics from the Chinese Stock 
and Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and on firm-specific 
characteristics from the SinoFin database. Our original sample consists of all firms 
listed on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002 to 2007. We 
begin our sample in 2002 because listed firms have been exercising new accounting 
and audit standards since 2001. Consistent with prior studies, we delete ST and *ST2 
firms from our population. To address the specially regulated industry consideration, 
we also exclude financial industry firms with unique accounting standards. Finally, we 
exclude observations for which information is missing. Our final sample consists of 
1,096 listed firms and 6,297 firm-year observations. Table 1 lists the detailed 
information on CEO turnover and departing CEOs. The total number of turnovers is 
 
2 ST stands for special treatment. The stock exchanges flag a listed firm ST when irregularities appear in 
its financial or accounting statement. These firms also have negative net profits for two consecutive 
years. *ST refers to listed firms that have negative net profits for three consecutive years and have a 
high probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges. 
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1,422.  
We manually collect the data on CEOs’ political connection by searching the listed 
firm’s annual reports from 2002 to 2007. For every firm in each year, we compile a 
CEO profile that includes age, gender, education, experience, and professional 
background. Based on this profile, we trace CEOs’ political connections by examining 
whether they are current or former officers of either the central government, the local 
government, or the military; are members of the standing committee of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), or the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC); or are the 
secretary or a member of a party committee in SOEs. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Distinguishing between forced and voluntary turnovers based on public 
information is difficult because the press is unlikely to explicitly mention whether the 
CEO turnover was forced or not. Therefore, to examine the effectiveness of 
monitoring CEO turnover as a punishment related to poor firm performance, we adopt 
the following procedure to define CEO turnover. First, we obtain the reasons for the 
CEO turnover from the CSMAR database and, for ease of exposition, partition them 
into two groups: normal and forced. The normal turnover group includes 745 cases in 
which the stated reasons are retirement, contract expiration, resignation, completion of 
active duties, health, personal reasons, change in controlling shareholder, legal 
disputes, and corporate governance reform. For the remaining turnovers, we trace the 
destinations of the departing CEOs to identify whether the turnover was normal or 
forced. Of the remaining 677 cases, 225 cases appear to be normal turnovers, 
including 10 cases in which the CEO took up a position in the government, 92 cases 
in which the CEO was promoted to chairman or vice chairman of the board, 51 cases 
in which the CEO accepted a managerial position in the parent company, 70 cases in 
which the CEO remained as chairman or vice-chairman, and 2 cases in which the 
CEO was going abroad for further education. 
We treat the remaining 452 cases as forced turnovers. These include 94 cases in 
which the CEO took up a less prestigious position within the firm, 22 cases in which 
the CEO left and took up a position in an unlisted or smaller firm, 42 cases in which 
the CEO was dismissed, and 294 cases in which the departing CEO’s destination is 
untraceable but CEOs are replaced in unusual circumstances within his tenure. We 
classify these latter as forced turnover because, given the numerous reasons for CEO 
departure, information on the turnover is unlikely to be unavailable if the turnover 
was voluntary. In addition, Firth et al. (2006) argue that resignation may be a face 
saving device for CEOs who would otherwise be punished or dismissed. We therefore 
conduct robustness tests by reclassifying resignation as a forced turnover.  
Of our original forced turnover sample, we exclude 31 cases in which the CEO 
tenure is less than one year, because such a short period is unlikely to reflect poor 
performance. We also add 20 cases for which the stated reason is retirement but the 
age of the departing CEO is lower than 60. Finally, we identify 981 cases as normal 
turnovers and 441 cases as forced turnovers, representing 68.99% and 31.01% of the 
total turnovers, respectively.  
4.2 Methodology 
   We apply the following regression to examine the effects of political connection 
on CEO turnovers and the turnover-performance relationship: 
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where Turnover is measured by forced turnover (as delineated above), which can 
reflect the effectiveness of the CEO monitoring mechanism. Perf is firm performance, 
measured as the return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS); Political is a 
dummy variable, coded 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; Size is 
firm size, defined as the log of firm total assets; and Age is the log of CEO age. 
Tenure is the log of years that the CEO has held the CEO position; Board is the log of 
the total number of directors on the board; Pond is the proportion of independent 
directors on the board; Lev is the firm leverage level; and Duality is a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. We also control 
for industry and year fixed effects.  
   Following Huson et al. (2001) and Chang and Wong (2009), we use the current 
year’s performance if the CEO turnover occurred in the second half of the year and 
the previous year’s performance if the CEO turnover occurred in the first half of the 
year. By doing so, we can partially address the endogeneity issue.  
 
4.3 Summary statistics 
   Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. As Panel 
A shows, the total turnover rate is 23%. Our regression also employs a set of control 
variables that show the average tenure of the CEOs to be 3.26 years, which is longer 
than that reported by Chang and Wong (2009). The mean value of CEO duality 
indicates that 12% of the total observations are CEOs who also serve as firm chairman. 
The results in Panel B also show a significant decrease in the annual turnover rate 
during the sample period, decreasing from 27.42% in 2002 to 20.63% in 2007. These 
results also indicate that normal turnover accounts for the majority (around 70%) of 
total turnovers. As outlined above, the reasons for forced turnovers are related to poor 
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performance and thus reflect the disciplinary power of the internal monitoring 
mechanism, whereas the reasons for normal turnovers include retirement, health 
problems, promotion, moving laterally, and accepting other prestigious positions. 
Since our paper examines the effect of political connection on CEO turnover and the 
turnover-performance relationship, the rest of the paper focuses only on forced CEO 
turnover.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Univariate tests 
   Table 3 shows the turnover rates by quartile of firm performance for the full 
sample: it also tests for equality between the lowest and highest quartiles. To do so, 
we divide the firms into four quartiles based on the industry-adjusted ROA (Panel A) 
and four quartiles based on the industry-adjusted ROS (Panel B). We find that CEO 
turnover rate increases with decreasing firm performance. First, the results in Panel A 
show that CEO turnover is significantly higher for firms with poor ROA than for 
firms with good ROA. Second, Panel B clearly reveals an association between poor 
ROS and forced CEO turnover. For example, firms with the poorest ROA (bottom 
quartile) replaced their CEOs in 9.39% of cases, whereas firms with the highest ROA 
only replaced their CEOs in 4.57% of cases, a 4.82% difference (9.39%-4.57%) 
(t-value = 5.35(2.35). These results generally support our hypothesis that forced CEO 
turnover is positively related to poor firm performance. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Table 4 reports the results of our univariate tests of CEO turnover. Here, we divide 
16 
 
                                                       
the total sample into two groups of firms with and without political connection. Then, 
to assess whether the CEO turnover rate shows significant differences, we sort the 
firms based on firm performance and managerial ownership. For example, in Panel A 
of Table 4, we divide our total sample into two subsamples (politically connected vs. 
non-politically firms) and sort them by industry-adjusted ROA. For firms with a 
higher firm performance, the mean (median) of the CEO turnover rate is 4.80% (0%) 
in politically connected firms, which is significantly lower than the 6.32% (0%) in 
non-politically connected firms (t-value = -1.92 (-3.62)). To test robustness, we then 
repeat our comparative analysis with firms sorted by industry-adjusted ROS and 
obtain similar results.3 Overall, the evidence suggests that politically connected CEOs 
are less likely to be replaced, and that in firms with managerial ownership, political 
connection can further weaken the turnover-performance relationship. These results 
are generally consistent with our main hypotheses.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 5 lists the results of our comparison of CEO turnover and firm and CEO 
characteristics. Panel A shows the results for politically connected versus 
non-politically connected firms based on whether the CEOs are politically connected. 
As column 1 illustrates, firms with politically connected CEOs not only exhibit 
significantly lower CEO turnover (t-value = -2.06) but also significantly lower firm 
performance (t-value is -5.84). In Panel B, however, which compares SOEs with 
privately controlled firms, the differences in CEO turnover are insignificant, 
indicating no difference in turnover between SOEs and privately controlled firms. 
Nonetheless, the average performance in SOEs is better than that in privately 
 
3 Because of their similarity, we do not report the results here, but the data are available from the authors on 
request. 
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controlled firms. These results provide evidence that CEOs in SOEs retain their 
positions for longer and are older than their counterparts in privately controlled firms 
(t-values = 4.27 and 12.36, respectively). Panel C, which compares firms with forced 
CEO turnover and normal turnover, suggests that both experience poor performance 
while forced one have worse ROS. Overall, the evidence in Table 5 mostly supports 
our hypotheses. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
5.2 Multivariate tests 
   Table 6 reports our regression estimations of the impact of CEO political 
connection on the turnover-performance relationship for the total sample. The firm 
performance measure in Panel A is the industry-adjusted ROA; in Panel B, it is the 
industry-adjusted ROS. Overall, the results given in Table 6 clearly show that a firm’s 
poor prior performance is significantly related to CEO turnover, a finding consistent 
with the evidence presented in Table 3 and one that supports our Hypothesis 1 that 
poorly performing CEOs are more likely than other CEOs to be replaced. Likewise, 
although the results are not robust to all our specifications, CEO political connection 
is negatively associated with CEO turnover, which supports Hypothesis 2 that CEOs 
with political connections are generally less likely to be replaced. Here, the interaction 
term between prior firm performance and political connection remains positive and 
significant at the 1% level in all specifications, strongly supporting Hypothesis 3 that 
political connection lowers the turnover-performance sensitivity. This finding offers 
new evidence that political connection feeds into the entrenchment ability of poorly 
performing CEOs.  
In addition, Mown, the proportion of shares held by the CEO, is negatively 
associated with CEO turnover, but the coefficient is not significant. The interactive 
18 
 
term between Mown and political connection, however, is negatively associated with 
CEO turnover, which suggests that politically connected CEOs, particularly those 
with more equity ownership, are less likely to be replaced. Similarly, the interaction 
term between political connection and the private firm dummy has a negative 
coefficient: political connected CEOs in privately controlled firms are less likely than 
those in state-owned firms to be replaced. One possible explanation for this 
observation is that politically connected CEOs bring benefits to privately controlled 
firms and hence have lower turnover rates.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Some control variables capture the possible influence of firm or CEO 
characteristics on CEO turnover. Of these, CEO age has a positive effect on turnover, 
whereas CEO tenure has a negative effect on turnover. As regards corporate 
governance variables, board size, independent director proportion, and CEO duality 
have no effect on CEO turnover. Moreover, in contrast to prior studies, we find no 
relation between CEO turnover and firm size and leverage. 
 
5.3 Tests for robustness  
The above analyses using firm performance as the criterion for replacing top 
management support the hypothesized association between CEO turnover and poor 
firm performance, which in turn implies that CEOs may focus on short term 
performance and have the incentive to manipulate cash flows and earnings (Chang 
and Wong, 2009). However, as our summary statistics show, the average CEO tenure 
is 3.26 years, suggesting that this use of annual firm performance may not totally 
reflect a CEO’s ability or contribution. Rather, bad firm performance could result 
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from such industry risks as policy and regulation changes and/or macroeconomic 
factors. We therefore create two additional firm performance measures, AROA 
(AROS), the average industry-adjusted ROA (ROS) over CEO tenure, and DROA 
(DROS), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm ROA (ROS) is higher than the 
median ROA (ROS) and 0 otherwise. We then re-estimate our main regression using 
these two additional measures in place of annual firm performance. We find broadly 
similar results to those reported in Table 6. Some may argue that poor prior stock 
performance is important for CEO forced turnovers, if small investors are able to 
exert influence on such disciplining mechanisms. We hence run the regression of CEO 
turnover by including stock annualized returns as independent variable which turn out 
to be insignificant.  
We also recognize that political connection is not completely exogenous; that is, 
certain firms (e.g., poor performers) may be more likely to hire CEOs with political 
connections. Therefore, to control for this endogeneity in our multivariate analysis, 
we carry out a two-stage logit regression in which the first stage controls for the 
selection of CEOs with political connections and the second stage uses the predicted 
probability of political connection as the variable of interest. The general results, 
given in Table 7, are similar to those for our OLS regression except that some 
variables in the 2SLS regression are less significant. For example, the interaction term 
between ROA and political connection remains significant and positive, suggesting 
that political connection reduces the CEO turnover-firm performance relationship. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
6. Post-turnover performance 
   The previous results suggest that CEO turnover is indeed related to poor firm 
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performance and that replacing the incumbent CEO is expected to improve firm 
profitability and performance when firms encounter financial distress. Our results also 
suggest that this relationship differs across firms with and without political connection. 
We therefore take advantage of our sample to examine the association between 
political connection and the changes in firm performance surrounding CEO turnover. 
6.1 Political connection versus nonpolitical connection  
   To examine post-turnover performance in politically versus non-politically 
connected firms (i.e., those with politically versus non-politically connected CEOs), 
we run univariate tests on the firm performance changes surrounding CEO turnover in 
each type of firm. Table 8 summarizes the mean and median of both the 
industry-adjusted ROA and ROS from three years before to three years after CEO 
turnover (year t = the year in which CEO turnover occurs, year t-1 = one year prior to 
CEO turnover, and year t+1 = one year after CEO turnover).  
   As Panel A shows, in politically connected firms, the mean (median) ROA shows 
a decline from three years before CEO replacement up to year t in which the CEO is 
replaced. After CEO replacement, the mean (median) ROA increases steadily all 
through the subsequent three years reaching 1.63 (2.41) in year t+3. The summary 
results for ROS show a similar trend: the mean (median) ROS decreases over the 
three years before the CEO turnover but begins to increase after the CEO turnover, 
reaching 2.47 (3.83) in year t+3. For the non-politically connected firms, reported in 
Panel B, the mean (median) of both the ROA and the ROS decrease from year t-3 to 
year t and then increase to 2.35 (3.02) and 3.63 (4.55), respectively, in year t+3. These 
results provide clear evidence that CEO turnover is indeed associated with poor firm 
performance and can help improve post-turnover firm performance. 
   We are also concerned, however, about the difference in firm performance 
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between politically and non-politically connected firms. We therefore compare firm 
performance between the t-3 group, the t group, and the t+3 group, as well as the 
average firm performance before CEO turnover and average firm performance after 
CEO turnover and firm performance in the t groups of the politically and 
non-politically connected firms. As Panel C shows, politically connected firms show a 
marginally significant 1.83% (0.71%) drop in the mean (median) ROA (t-value = 1.67 
(1.77)). After CEO replacement, the mean (median) ROA increases to 1.63 (2.41), 
which although higher than that for the t group is insignificant (t-value = -1.08 
(-1.60)). This comparison of average firm performance thus provides consistent 
evidence that CEO replacement occurs because of poor firm performance and that 
average firm performance increases significantly after CEO replacement (t-value = 
-1.95 (-1.15)). The ROS comparison for politically connected firms provides similar 
results but the range is larger. The mean (median) ROS decreases by 7.34% (1.76%) 
from t-3 to t (t-value = 1.99 (1.88)) and increases by 4.92% (1.42%) from t to t+3 
(t-value = -1.14 (-1.65)).  
For non-politically connected firms, the results, given in Panel D, show a 
significant 1.83% (0.71%) reduction in the mean (median) ROA (t-value = 2.38 (1.78)) 
but a 2.25% (1.08%) increase in year t+3 (t-value is -1.96 (-3.09)). The average firm 
performance before and after CEO turnover is significantly higher than that for the 
year t group (t-values = 2.16 (2.32) and -1.96 (-1.64), respectively). The ROS 
comparison shows a broadly similar trend  
Overall, this evidence is consistent with both our conjecture and our regression 
results and reflects both the effectiveness of management monitoring and a weakened 
turnover-performance relationship in politically connected firms. More important, the 
results also show that post-turnover performance in non-politically connected firms is 
better than that in politically connected firms, which suggests an entrenchment effect 
of politically connected CEOs. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
In addition to the above univariate tests, we also apply the following regression to 
test the effect of political connection on post-replacement firm performance in the 
sample of firms in which CEO turnover occurs:  
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7            
it it it it it
it it it it
Perf Political Size Board Pond
Lev Age Tenure
α α α α α
α α α ε
Δ = + + + +
+ + + +
          (2) 
where Perf is the change in firm performance used in the univariate tests. We 
choose this measurement because it allows assessment of whether firm performance 
increases following CEO turnover. All other variables are as defined in Equation (1). 
The estimation results are given in Table 9, which reports the outcomes when the 
dependent variable is measured as the difference in firm performance between the 
average of year (t+1, t+3) and year t.
Δ
4 In general, the multivariate results suggest that 
for politically connected listed firms, the post-turnover performance shows a less 
significant improvement than in non-politically connected firms.  
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
6.2 Turnover versus nonturnover  
To enable comparison of post-turnover performance within politically connected 
firms with and without CEO turnover, we assume a CEO turnover when the length of 
CEO tenure reaches four years (because the average tenure for CEOs is 3.26 years). 
We then run univariate tests on the firm performance changes surrounding this 
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4 We also apply three other firm performance measures; namely, the difference in firm performance between year 
t+3 and t and between t-3 and t, and the average of (t-3, t-1) and t. The results for all three variables are consistent 
with those for the above univariate tests.  
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assumed turnover.5 Consistent with the univariate tests reported in Section 6.1, in 
Table 10, we summarize the mean and median of both the industry-adjusted ROA and 
the industry-adjusted ROS from three years before to three years after CEO turnover. 
For politically connected firms without CEO turnover (Panel B), the mean (median) 
ROA remains positive before turnover but drops to negative after it, and the mean 
(median) ROS shows a similar trend. In terms of the equality of the firm performance 
changes during the period surrounding the turnover, the comparison results for the 
firms with CEO turnover indicate that firm performance increases significantly after 
CEO replacement (Panel C), while those for the firms without CEO turnover indicate 
that firm performance across these years does not differ significantly (Panel D).  
We also compare the degree of change in firm performance between firms with 
forced turnover and those without connections whose CEOs are politically connected. 
As Panel E, Table 10 shows, the difference test indicates that the increase in firm 
performance for the group of firms with CEO turnover is significantly higher than that 
for the group of firms without CEO turnover. Together with the evidence from the 
summary statistics on politically connected firms with CEO turnover, the results 
indicate that the CEO monitoring mechanism is effective in politically connected 
firms. More important, the overall evidence suggests an entrenchment effect for 
politically connected CEOs; that is, politically connected CEOs retain their 
managerial positions even if they underperform. Once these politically connected 
CEOs are replaced, however, post-turnover firm performance can improve 
significantly.  
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
 
 
5 We also tested the robustness of these results using an assumed turnover at three years of tenure..  
To provide supportive evidence, we apply the following regression to examine the 
effect of political connection on post-turnover performance using the sample of 
politically connected firms: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7            
it it it it it
it it it it
Perf Turnover Size Board Pond
Lev Age Tenure
α α α α α
α α α ε
Δ = + + + +
+ + + +
          (3) 
where Turnover is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is replaced and 0 
otherwise. All other variables are defined as in Equation (2). In general, the regression 
results, reported in Table 11, indicate that the turnover of politically connected CEOs 
can produce a more significant improvement in firm performance than occurs in firms 
where no such turnover takes place. 
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
 
7. Conclusion 
 In China, currently the largest transitional economy, political intervention and 
influence have important implications for both social and economic activity. The 
political connection of CEOs, particularly, whether in state-owned or privately 
controlled firms, may be seen as both a means of securing property rights protection 
and as a major source of rent-seeking behavior. In China, however, the lack of legal 
protection for investors means that minority shareholders frequently have limited 
influence over management. Thus, internal monitoring mechanisms, particularly CEO 
turnover, play an important role in disciplining management. Because such turnover 
may be linked to political connection, we examine the effect of CEO political 
connection on corporate governance, focusing particularly on its association with 
CEO turnover and the turnover-performance relationship. In doing so, we provide the 
first empirical evidence that CEO political connection not only has a substantial 
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impact on CEO turnover and the turnover-performance relationship but also a 
differential effect on SOEs versus privately controlled firms.  
   Using an extensive 2002−2007 sample of China’s listed firms, we find that CEO 
turnover is associated with poor prior firm performance and that 
turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger in privately controlled than in 
state-owned firms. We also provide evidence that political connection has a negative 
effect on CEO turnover, suggesting it can reduce the likelihood of CEOs’ being 
replaced, and lowers turnover-performance sensitivity, implying a substitution effect 
on internal disciplinary mechanism that enhances the entrenchment of poor-quality 
CEOs with political backgrounds. We further find that privately controlled firms are 
more likely than SOEs to retain politically connected CEOs and that the CEO 
turnover-firm performance relationship is much weaker if the CEOs hold managerial 
ownership. Following the forced turnover of CEOs, however, firm performance 
improves, especially in firms whose CEOs have no political connections. Overall, our 
findings suggest that in an emerging economy, political connections have a significant 
influence on corporate governance; most particularly, an adverse effect on internal 
monitoring mechanisms that results in undesirable management entrenchment.     
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Table 1.   Reasons for CEO turnover 
This table reports the reasons for and frequencies of CEO turnover in China’s listed firms between 
2002 and 2007.  
Reasons for turnover  Number of observations Percentage of sample 
1. Normal turnover 981 a 68.99% 
Retirement 22 1.55% 
Contract expiration 298 20.96% 
Change in controlling shareholder 12 0.84% 
Resignation 300 21.10% 
Health 37 2.60% 
Personal reasons 36 2.53% 
Corporate governance reform 25 1.76% 
Legal dispute 1 0.07% 
Completion of active duties 14 0.98% 
Important government position taken up 10 0.70% 
Promoted to chairman or vice-chairman 92 6.47% 
CEO position taken up at parent company 51 3.59% 
Remaining as chairman or vice-chairman 70 4.92% 
Going abroad to study 2 0.14% 
2. Forced turnover 441 b 31.01% 
  New position ranked lower than CEO position 94 6.61% 
  CEO position taken up at an unlisted, smaller firm 22 1.55% 
  Dismissed 42 2.95% 
  Details not provided 294 20.68% 
Total number of observations 1422 100% 
 
a We delete 20 cases in which the stated reason is retirement but the age of the departing CEO is 
lower than 60. We also add 31 cases in which the tenure of the departing CEO is less than 1 year. 
Eventually, we obtain 981 normal turnovers. 
b We add 20 cases in which the stated reason is retirement but the age of the departing CEO is 
lower than 60. We also delete 31 cases in which the tenure of the departing CEO is less than 1 year. 
Eventually, we obtain 441 forced turnovers. 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Median 
Lower 25% 
quartile 
Higher 25% 
quartile 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the full sample 
Turnover 0.23 0 0 1 
ROA (%) 2.25 2.64 0.84 5.12 
ROS (%) 4.05 4.43 1.49 9.80 
Firm size (million) 3,940 1,770 1,010 3,390 
Lev (%) 49.71 50.25 36.92 62.10 
CEO tenure 3.26 3 1.92 4.33 
CEO age 46.47 46 41 51 
CEO duality 0.12 0 0 0 
Board 9.76 9 9 11 
Independent directors 3.13 3 3 4 
Panel B: Turnover rate across years 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total turnovers 269 242 231 255 216 209 
Percentage a 27.42% 23.96% 21.08% 22.87% 20.96% 20.63% 
Normal turnovers 198 160 155 176 142 152 
Percentage b 73.61% 66.12% 67.10% 69.02% 65.74% 72.73% 
Forced turnovers 71 82 76 79 74 57 
Percentage b 26.39% 33.88% 32.90% 30.98% 34.26% 27.27% 
a The percentage of total turnover is the ratio of the number of turnovers to the total firm year 
observations for a specific year.  
b The percentage of normal and forced turnover is the ratio of normal and forced turnovers to the 
number of total turnovers. 
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Table 3.  Forced turnover rate according to firm performance quartile 
 Firm performance CEO turnover 
Penal A: Summary statistics based on ROA (%) 
Bottom quartile -7.97(-2.56) 0.0939 
Second quartile -0.91(-0.91) 0.0747 
Third quartile 1.17(1.15) 0.0658 
Top quartile 6.21(4.95) 0.0457 
Difference (t-test) a  5.35***(2.35**) 
Penal B: Summary statistics based on ROS (%) 
Bottom quartile -35.86(-5.99) 0.0959 
Second quartile -1.49(-1.52) 0.0699 
Third quartile 2.09(1.86) 0.0636 
Top quartile 20.27(10.79) 0.0507 
Difference (t-test) a  4.89***(2.20**) 
a The above table displays the results of the difference tests between the bottom and top quartiles 
and reports the t-values (p-values). 
The value in the firm performance column is the mean (median) within the quartiles. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Univariate test of CEO turnover based on performance and ownership  
 Politically connected Non-politically connected t-test 
Panel A: Firms sorted by firm performance (ROA) 
Upper 4.80(0) 6.32(0) -1.92*(-3.62**) 
Lower 7.83(0) 8.97(0) -1.36(-1.87*) 
t-test -3.44**(-2.09**) -2.85**(-1.72*)  
Panel B: Privately controlled firms sorted by firm performance (ROA) 
Upper 0.95(0) 7.52(0) -5.43**(-2.64**) 
Lower 7.96(0) 10.12(0) -2.06**(1.05) 
t-test -4.31**(-2.31**) -2.45**(-2.51**)  
Panel C: Firms sorted by CEO’s equity ownership 
Upper 2.61(0) 2.79(0) -2.23**(-0.05) 
Lower 7.74(0) 9.69(0) -2.32**(-5.33**) 
t-test -6.47**(-4.79**) -8.46**(-9.67**)  
The mean (median) value is CEO turnover rate (%), and “Upper” and “Lower” refer to firms 
whose performance is above or below the median value. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.  Comparison of firm and CEO characteristics 
 Turnover ROA ROS Levera
ge 
Firm 
size 
Board Pond CEO 
tenure 
CEO 
age 
Obs 
Panel A: Firms sorted by CEO political connection 
Political 6.32 
(0) 
-1.03 
(-0.16) 
-3.91 
(-0.13) 
50.21 
(50.17) 
21.36 
(21.26) 
2.27 
(2.19) 
0.32 
(0.33) 
3.15 
(2.67) 
46.93 
(47.00) 
3039 
Non-political 7.64 
(0) 
0.24 
(0.13) 
-3.59 
(0.12) 
49.24 
(50.37) 
21.41 
(21.32) 
2.24 
(2.19) 
0.33 
(0.33) 
2.90 
(2.58) 
44.45 
(43.00) 
3258 
t-test 
Wilcoxon test 
-2.06 
(0.91) 
-5.84 
(3.69) 
-0.12 
(1.86) 
1.49 
(0.61) 
-1.90 
(1.82) 
4.31 
(4.05) 
-4.49 
(5.39) 
5.69 
(3.24) 
14.95 
(14.62) 
 
Panel B: Firms sorted by firm type 
SOEs 6.95 
(0) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-1.21 
(-0.09) 
48.57 
(49.40) 
21.49 
(21.41) 
2.27 
(2.19) 
0.32 
(0.33) 
3.08 
(2.67) 
46.28 
(46.00) 
4659 
Private 7.14 
(0) 
-1.35 
(-0.10) 
-10.98 
(0.27) 
52.95 
(52.36) 
21.07 
(21.01) 
2.19 
(2.19) 
0.34 
(0.33) 
2.87 
(2.5) 
43.86 
(43.00) 
1638 
t-test 
Wilcoxon test 
-0.26 
(0.12) 
4.26 
(2.09) 
1.67 
(1.02) 
-4.25 
(4.93) 
17.02 
(14.68) 
13.48 
(12.48) 
-10.80 
(8.08) 
4.27 
(3.11) 
12.36 
(12.80) 
 
Panel C: Firms sorted by turnover type a
Forced N/A -2.41 
(-0.79) 
-21.98 
(-1.05) 
53.05 
(52.11) 
21.33 
(21.25) 
2.25 
(2.19) 
0.32 
(0.33) 
3.14 
(2.2) 
43.76 
(43.01) 
441 
Normal N/A -2.45 
(-0.74) 
-14.48 
(-1.01) 
51.51 
(51.55) 
21.22 
(21.16) 
2.24 
(2.19) 
0.32 
(0.33) 
2.83 
(2.00) 
43.67 
(43.00) 
981 
t-test 
Wilcoxon test 
 0.07 
(0.78) 
-0.66 
(1.03) 
0.60 
(0.33) 
1.81 
(1.52) 
1.19 
(0.21) 
-0.65 
(0.15) 
2.94 
(3.05) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
 
a This comparative sample excludes the firm year observations without CEO turnover. 
The table reports the mean (median) values. 
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Table 6.  Logit regression results for the total sample 
Dependent variable: Probability of forced CEO turnover 
Panel A: Regression results when firm performance is measured by industry-adjusted ROA 
Constant -7.14***(-3.86) -7.53***(-4.04) -6.94***(-3.60) -6.92***(-3.62) 
ROAt-1 -1.41**(-2.38) -5.00***(-4.40) -4.89***(-4.29) -4.86***(-4.27) 
Political -0.33***(-2.71) -0.25**(-2.07) -0.16(-1.19) -0.09(-0.69) 
ROAt-1*Political  4.55***(3.75) 4.29***(3.50) 4.37***(3.55) 
Mown -0.14(-1.55) -0.12(-1.43) -0.12(-1.41) -0.10(-1.39) 
Mown*Political    -5.26*(-1.65) 
Private   -0.01(-0.01) -0.06(-0.04) 
Private*Political   -0.57*(-1.73) -0.58*(-1.74) 
Size 0.04(0.58) 0.06(0.90) 0.05(0.70) 0.04(0.61) 
Age 0.84**(2.12) 0.82**(2.09) 0.77*(1.93) 0.79**(2.02) 
Tenure -1.43***(-26.62) -1.42***(-26.70) -1.43***(-27.09) -1.42***(-26.71) 
Board 0.19(0.69) 0.18(0.63) 0.12(0.45) 0.12(0.42) 
Pond 1.04(1.33) 0.95(1.23) 0.98(1.27) 0.99(1.27) 
Lev -0.06(-0.04) -0.09(-0.39) -0.06(-0.22) -0.04(-0.17) 
Duality -0.36*(-1.64) -0.33(-1.55) -0.28(-1.36) -0.27(-1.27) 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.2695 0.2739 0.2759 0.2785 
Obs 6297 6297 6297 6297 
Panel B: Regression results when firm performance is measured by industry- adjusted ROS 
Constant -6.69***(-3.62) -6.67***(-3.60) -5.97***(-3.13) -5.99***(-3.16) 
ROSt-1 -0.08**(-2.40) -0.19**(-2.20) -0.19**(-2.19) -0.18**(-2.19) 
Political -0.32**(-2.57) -0.29**(-2.34) -0.18(-1.42) -0.12(-0.92) 
ROSt-1*Political  0.23**(2.49) 0.22**(2.48) 0.22**(2.50) 
Mown -0.15(-1.59) -0.14(-1.58) -0.14(-1.55) -0.12(-1.55) 
Mown*Political    -5.31*(-1.67) 
Private   -0.03(-0.16) -0.03(-0.18) 
Private*Political   -0.57*(-1.72) -0.58*(-1.75) 
Size 0.02(0.28) 0.02(0.19) -0.02(-0.04) -0.02(-0.10) 
Age 0.82**(2.06) 0.82**(2.06) 0.75*(1.87) 0.78**(1.96) 
Tenure -1.43***(-26.55) -1.43***(-26.48) -1.43***(-26.90) -1.43***(-26.53) 
Board 0.19(0.67) 0.21(0.72) 0.15(0.51) 0.14(0.49) 
Pond 0.96(1.22) 0.98(1.25) 1.02(1.29) 1.02(1.31) 
Lev 0.16(1.53) 0.24**(2.00) 0.28**(2.13) 0.28**(2.12) 
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Duality -0.34(-1.59) -0.36*(-1.65) -0.31(-1.43) -0.29(-1.35) 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.2686 0.2708 0.2729 0.2755 
Obs 6297 6297 6297 6297 
The dependent variable is the probability of forced CEO turnover. Firm performance is measured 
by both return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), defined as the ratio of net income 
before tax to firm total assets and of net income before tax to firm total sales, respectively. The 
regressions employ both the industry-adjusted ROA and the industry-adjusted ROS. Political is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; Mown is the 
CEO’s control right, defined as the proportion of shares held by the CEO.; and Private is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm has a private controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise. Size is the log 
of firm total assets; Age is the log of CEO age; and Tenure is the log of years that the CEO has 
held this position. Board is the log of total directors on the board and Pond is the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. Lev is the firm leverage level, and Duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise.  
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Two-stage logit regression. 
First stage: Dependent variable = CEO political connection 
Constant -7.92***(-5.26) -6.87***(-4.63) 
ROA -2.19***(-4.82)  
ROS  -0.07(-0.29) 
Tenure 0.03(0.88) 0.02(0.42) 
Age 2.46***(7.57) 2.40***(7.42) 
Size -0.10**(-2.07) -0.15***(-2.85) 
Board 0.49**(2.28) 0.48**(2.23) 
Pond -1.22**(-2.46) -1.26**(-2.55) 
Duality 0.31**(2.08) 0.32**(2.20) 
Year Included Included 
Industry Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.0332 0.0284 
Obs 6297 6297 
Second stage: Dependent variable = CEO turnover 
Constant -12.52(-0.76) -11.82(-0.51) 
ROAt-1 -11.70(-1.43) -0.15(-1.00) 
Political connection -4.50(-0.38) -5.83(-0.29) 
Mown -0.05**(-2.00) -0.03**(-2.37) 
ROAt-1*Political connection 12.46**(2.46) 0.42*(1.70) 
Private -0.86(-1.46) -0.68(-1.10) 
Private*Political connection 1.58(1.31) 1.15(0.91) 
Mown*Political connection -0.17**(-1.98) -0.08**(-2.42) 
Size -0.07(-0.23) -0.19(-0.28) 
Age 3.23(0.46) 3.84(0.33) 
Tenure -1.38***(-12.81) -1.41***(-15.58) 
Board 0.62(0.44) 0.75(0.33) 
Pond -0.14(-0.04) -0.59(-0.10) 
Lev 0.13(0.76) 0.21*(1.91) 
Duality -0.05(-0.06) -0.06(-0.04) 
Year Included Included 
Industry Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.2731 0.2688 
Obs 6297 6297 
Here, firm performance is measured by both return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), 
and the regressions apply both the industry-adjusted ROA and the industry-adjusted ROS. All 
other variables are defined as in Table 7. 
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The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8.  Firm performance surrounding CEO turnover 
 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3 
Panel A: Summary statistics for firm performance in politically connected firms a
ROA 2.22(2.30) 2.73(2.31) 2.04(1.83) 0.39(1.59) 0.89(1.49) 1.48(1.76) 1.63(2.41) 
ROS 4.99(4.17) 6.49(4.28) 1.46(3.07) -2.35(2.41) -0.45(2.49) 2.73(3.18) 2.47(3.83) 
Observations 85 111 151 192 141 100 83 
Panel B: Summary statistics for firm performance in non-politically connected firms b
ROA 2.66(2.67) 2.43(2.55) 1.30(1.94) 0.10(1.94) 1.96(2.66) 2.68(2.51) 2.35(3.02) 
ROS 5.69(5.75) 1.89(4.67) 0.09(3.23) -28.71(3.77) -4.24(3.90) 2.77(4.47) 3.63(4.55) 
Observations 96 134 183 249 196 153 112 
Panel C: Difference tests for firm performance surrounding politically connected CEO turnover 
Different 
tests  
(t-3 and t) (average of (t-3, t-1) and 
t) 
(t and average of (t+1, 
t+3)) 
(t and t+3) 
t-tests of 
ROA 
1.67*(1.77*) 2.86***(2.94***) -1.95*(-1.15) -1.08(-1.60) 
t-tests of 
ROS 
1.99**(1.88*) 2.12**(1.89*) -1.98**(-1.03) -1.14(-1.65*) 
Panel D: Difference tests for firm performance surrounding non-politically connected CEO turnover 
Different 
tests 
(t-3 and t) (average of (t-3, t-1) and 
t) 
(t and average of (t+1, 
t+3)) 
(t and t+3) 
t-tests of 
ROA 
2.38**(1.78*) 2.16**(2.32**) -1.96**(-1.64*) -1.96**(-3.09***) 
t-tests of 
ROS 
2.15**(2.79***) 1.71*(1.88*) -1.81*(-1.70*) -2.16**(-2.12**) 
a This group of firms replaced politically connected CEOs. 
b This group of firms replaced non-politically connected CEOs.  
Note: the value used for the comparisons are the industry-adjusted ROA and the industry-adjusted 
ROS. The table reports the mean (median) values. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9.  CEO political connection effect on post-turnover performance for firms with CEO 
turnover 
Dependent variable ∆ROA ∆ROS 
Political -0.02*(-1.76) -0.02**(2.57) 
Size 0.02**(2.53) 0.04**(2.20) 
Board -0.03(-1.15) -0.13*(-1.64) 
Pond 0.01(0.12) 0.03(0.15) 
Lev -0.08**(-2.31) -0.36***(-3.59) 
Age 0.05(1.16) 0.12(1.09) 
Tenure -0.01(-0.12) 0.01(0.83) 
Industry Included Included 
Year Included Included 
Observations 459 459 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.05 
Here, the dependent variable is the difference in firm performance between the averages for years 
(t+1, t+3) and t. All other variables are defined as in previous tables. We report only the results for 
the primary variables.  
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 10.  Comparison of firm performance surrounding CEO turnover in politically connected 
firms  
a The comparison results in Panels C, D, and E are based on an assumed CEO turnover at four 
years of tenure (because CEO tenure averages 3.26 years). 
 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3 
Panel A: Summary statistics for firm performance in politically connected firms: with CEO turnover  
ROA 2.22(2.30) 2.73(2.31) 2.04(1.83) 0.39(1.59) 0.89(1.49) 1.48(1.76) 1.63(2.41) 
ROS 4.99(4.17) 6.49(4.28) 1.46(3.07) -2.35(2.41) -0.45(2.49) 2.73(3.18) 2.47(3.83) 
Observations 85 111 151 192 141 100 83 
Panel B: Summary statistics for firm performance in politically connected firms: no CEO turnover a
ROA 0.33(0.16) 0.61(0.19) 0.53(0.05) 0.10(0.16) 0.53(0.03) -0.84(1.07) -1.43(0.55) 
ROS 1.25(0.69) 2.45(0.15) 1.62(0.28) 0.13(0.28) 0.75(-0.09) -0.40(1.28) -0.55(-0.16) 
Observations 180 205 236 306 220 156 57 
Panel C: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE surrounding politically connected CEO turnover 
Different 
tests  
(t-3 and t) (average of (t-3, t-1) 
and t) 
(t and average of 
(t+1, t+3)) 
(t and t+3) 
t-tests of 
ROA 
1.67*(1.77*) 2.86***(2.94***) -1.95*(-1.15) -1.08(-1.60) 
t-tests of 
ROS 
1.99**(1.88*) 2.12**(1.89*) -1.98**(-1.03) -1.14(-1.65*) 
Panel D: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE surrounding politically connected CEO turnover 
in firms without turnover a  
Different 
tests  
(t-3 and t) (average of (t-3, t-1) 
and t) 
(t and average of 
(t+1, t+3)) 
(t and t+3) 
t-tests of 
ROA 
-0.42(-0.28) -0.85(0.36) 0.81(-0.49) -1.34(0.05) 
t-tests of 
ROS 
-0.55(-0.98) -0.76(-0.15) 0.32(-0.86) -2.27**(-0.73) 
Panel E: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE across these two groups (turnover vs. no turnover) 
Different 
tests  
(t-3 and t) (average of (t-3, t-1) 
and t) 
(t and average of 
(t+1, t+3)) 
(t and t+3) 
t-tests of 
ROA 
-1.14(-0.19) -2.64***(-2.43**) 2.07**(1.70*) 1.21(2.19**) 
t-tests of 
ROS 
-1.70*(-0.13) -1.64*(-1.83*) 1.66*(1.68*) 1.72*(2.97***) 
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Table 11.   CEO turnover effect on subsequent firm performance for politically connected 
firms  
Dependent variable ∆ROA ∆ROS 
Turnover 0.06**(2.46) 0.02**(2.04) 
Size 0.03***(6.25) 0.03(0.29) 
Board -0.02(-0.14) -0.04(-0.13) 
Pond 0.04(0.93) 0.70(0.76) 
Lev -0.15***(-7.00) -0.63(-1.45) 
Age 0.02(0.73) -0.03(-0.06) 
Tenure 0.05(1.28) -0.02(-0.31) 
Year and Industry Included Included 
Observations 1461 1461 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.03 
Here, the dependent variable is the difference in firm performance between the averages for years 
(t+1, t+3) and t. All other variables are as defined in previous tables. We report only the results for 
the primary variables.  
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
